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 Much research has considered the effects of the presence of large youth populations in 
various areas on conflict. The literature lacks a clear verdict, although some have suggested the 
existence of a significant link between youth bulges and political violence. My research seeks to 
examine the connection between the presence of large populations of people between the ages of 
15 and 24 and protest activity. Unlike previous studies, the scope of this project is limited to the 
experience of Sub-Saharan Africa, and the youth bulge is tabulated differently. The data for this 
research was collected from various databases of relevant indicators. I utilize a fixed-effects 
regression model that allows for an examination of the change of the relationship between age 
and protests in the region over a 25-year period. Controlling for several variables, I find a small, 
but significant effect of the youth bulge on protests. The study also posits that certain societal 
conditions, such as the prevalence of polygamous marriages, tend to strengthen the relationship 
by offering young men few alternatives to conflict. I look at two countries, Nigeria and Tanzania, 
and determine that sub-national data also support the notion that the practice of polygamy 
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 For the majority of human history, the life of the average person can only be described as 
nasty, brutish, and short. As a result of numerous factors, including high infant mortality rates 
and the threat posed by infectious diseases across the lifespan, life expectancy was low in early 
human societies. According to the Encyclopædia Britannica, human life expectancy during the 
Bronze Age was about 26 at birth; even in the late medieval English peerage, life expectancies of 
30 at birth and 43 at age 21 were observed. Likewise, human pre-industrial societies were also 
characterized by the presence of very high birth rates. The economic demand for children in an 
agriculture-intensive society, coupled with a lack of contraceptive methods, meant that women 
could expect to bear as many as 7 or 8 children, on average, over the course of their lifespans. 
 The practical effect of these coexisting realities, in both pre-industrial Western societies 
and in present-day countries still in the early stages of their demographic transition, is that the 
median age of the population is very low. In modern Niger, for instance, half the country is 
younger than 15, and this same reality is replicated across the African continent. Contrast this 
with the situation in Japan, where one of the world’s highest life expectancies is coupled with 
one of its lowest fertility rates; this is in turn joined with the legacy of the country’s extremely 
short post-World War II baby boom to create a populace with a median age of nearly 47. In 
aggregate, societies’ demographic profiles change and evolve over time, and this constant 
evolution has myriad implications for societal stability, unrest, and upheaval.   
 When a country is discovered to have a large population of young people, it is often said 
that that nation exhibits a so-called “youth bulge.” Often used with a sense of alarm by laypeople 
and scholars alike, this term accurately describes the situation on the ground in many nations 
around the world, including most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. The concerns arising from 
Lazar 5 
 
large populations of young people have their roots in a belief that young people between the ages 
of 15 and 24, and especially young men, are the most likely sector of a nation’s populace to 
engage in political violence. According to scholarship within the field of evolutionary 
psychology, times in which these young men are particularly “unmoored” from society’s 
institutions, either due to lack of marriage, education, or employment prospects, are associated 
with an increase in the risk of conflict.  
 Understanding the relationship between youth bulges and political violence is perhaps 
most crucial in the context of Sub-Saharan Africa, where very large youth populations coexist 
with frequent protest events and other forms of civil conflict. While it is clear that teenage boys 
and young adult men play a particularly outsized and crucial role in these events, less well-
known is whether or not their very presence ushers in the societal norms and realities that allow 
conflict to occur. 
 In this paper, I shall attempt to at least partially answer this question. This line of inquiry 
is one that comes with a host of policy implications. If a strong relationship can be established 
between the relative size of a given state’s youth cohort and protest activity in that country, then 
the importance of furnishing effective birth control and sex education will only become more 
readily apparent. The possibility that these individuals’ psychosocial angst could be actively 
redirected into post-secondary education and employment opportunities would have to be more 
thoroughly analyzed. Gender imbalances in marriage arising out of polygamous unions and sex-
selective abortions that result in “missing women” would have to be more robustly interrogated 
and possible solutions would have to be appropriately explored. 
 I begin by providing an overview of the recent relevant literature regarding population 
demography, civil war, protest, and male alienation. I then discuss the methods that I employ in 
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my study. The data for this research was collected from myriad databases of social conflict, 
population dynamics, and national economic and political indicators. I employ a fixed-effects 
regression model that allows for an examination of the change of the relationship between age 
and protests in most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa over a 25-year period. Controlling for a 
number of variables, I find a small, but significant effect of the youth bulge on localized protests. 
Nevertheless, the reality is complicated by the fact that certain societal conditions, such as the 
practice of polygamy, seem to exacerbate the overall effect. 
 The results are then presented, discussed, and interpreted in the context of the prior work 
on this subject. In many ways, the central finding is not surprising and falls into agreement with 
much of the literature. On the other hand, many studies exist which have failed to find a similar 
association. This paper is unique in that it eschews a global focus in favor of a regional one, in 
addition to making some methodological modifications. Case studies of the Nigerian and 
Tanzanian experience seek to localize the broader findings of the paper and to discuss how they 
apply to the history and realities of individual African nations, coming to similar conclusions as 












 There exists a large and, at times, contradictory literature surrounding the relationship 
between large male youth populations and political violence. As is often the case in social 
science research, the myriad ways in which a particular variable is defined has a strong impact 
upon the obtained result. As such, it is important to pay special attention to these definitions and 
to mechanisms through which the noted relationships are purported to express themselves. It is 
also important to explore the mechanisms that strengthen or weaken the noted relationship. 
 I shall begin by furnishing a brief overview of the relationship between youth bulges, 
male alienation, and civil conflict as discussed in the popular press. Secondly, I examine the 
demography literature insofar as it explains the origin of youth bulges. Thirdly, I will provide a 
look at the civil war literature. Because the causes of conflict are deeply multifaceted, it is 
essential to understand how demographics work with other factors in an interlocking manner to 
create the societal conditions in which the flames of conflict can spread. Fourth, I examine the 
protest literature and the ways in which it differs from civil war theories. Finally, I will explore 
my central question more directly by giving an overview of the relationship between 
demographics and conflict as it has been previously established or refuted, exploring both the 
civil war and protest angles. 
 
I.  Youth bulges and male alienation in the popular imagination 
 In recent years, the Western media has been swept up in an increased fascination with the 
concept of large youth populations, primarily due to three disparate factors. Attempts at 
accounting for the causes of terrorism, as well as providing an account of the dawn of the Arab 
Spring and the problem of East Asia’s “missing women” have all drawn the attention of the press 
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insofar as they feature either large youth populations or gender-imbalanced demographic profiles 
at the center of the story. I consider each, and their significance to this study, in turn. 
 Western fears of terrorism in the post-9/11 era have seen the eruption of a multitude of 
analyses in the media surrounding the roots causes of terrorism. Often the analysis is 
psychological or sociological in nature, focusing on mental health issues and the ways in which 
terrorists were socialized into their adopted group identities. But at the center of it all is the 
young, alienated male in search of an identity, often with no prospects for serious career 
advancement or education. Often times this focus is placed upon Saudi Arabia, the homeland of 
15 of the 19 September 11th attackers. As Caryle Murphy notes in her paper for the Wilson 
Center (2011), 51% of the Kingdom’s population is under the age of 25. The country’s large 
number of foreign workers, its bloated public sector, and its heavy reliance on fossil fuels means 
that many of the country’s young people feel that they have little to no reasonable job prospects. 
Add to that the sexual frustration faced by many due to Kingdom’s rigid gender segregation 
laws, and it is perhaps no surprise that many young men are tempted by the reach of radical 
Islamic organizations, groups that offer them an identity, a cause to fight for, and a belief that 
they are making something important of their lives. In other words, the effects of the youth bulge 
are magnified through the economic alienation of the populace. 
 Indeed, it has been shown on a number of occasions that youth bulges and terrorism are 
linked through the process of urbanization (Lia, 2005:141; Goldstone, 2001). Many parts of the 
developing world, including the Middle East and Africa, are currently experiencing rapid 
population growth at the same time that they are urbanizing. The combination of an ever-
growing young cohort, increased population densities, and cultural alienation points to an 
elevated likelihood that many young men will turn to terrorism. 
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 Likewise, much has been said in the media over the past few years about the young 
people at the heart of the 2011 Arab Spring. Recently, The Economist discussed the Middle 
East’s young population profile and the fact that youth unemployment in the region is twice the 
global average (2016). In his well-known book The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of 
World Order, political scientist Samuel Huntington asserts that he does not believe Islam to 
innately be a more violent religion than others, but that its youthfulness means that its 
practitioners are more likely to engage in terrorism or civil conflict (2001:1). Likewise, Fareed 
Zakaria discusses the destabilizing nature of youth bulges on the Muslim world in a 2001 
Newsweek article, arguing that these young men will pose a danger to the region and to the world 
for years to come. 
 At the core of this demographic theory lies the notion that it is young men in particular 
who unleash violence upon a society when their numbers are excessively large. In an aptly-titled 
2016 article called “Of men and mayhem,” the editors of The Economist warn of the dangers of 
large populations of “unmoored men.” After all, men kill other men at a rate nearly a hundred 
times that of their female counterparts. Matt Ridley argues in “The Evolution of Everything” that 
young men in their late teens and early 20s have a strong appetite for violence due to their 
competition for mating opportunities.  
 As such, a lack of opportunities for family formation appears to be especially dangerous. 
When marriage markets are as unbalanced as they are in certain parts of the world, many young 
men are left without any serious prospects for partnership, thus leaving them “unmoored” from 
one of society’s central institutions. In East Asia, this imbalance arises from the sex-selective 
abortions that have created a population imbalance. In the Muslim world, including in the Middle 
East and across much of Africa, the practice of polygamy similarly constricts the marriage 
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market. If opportunities for civil conflict to erupt are to be limited, it is important to consider 
how other factors work in tandem with each other and with demographics to bring about a 
scenario where the likelihood of political violence is relatively high. 
 
II. Why do youth bulges exist? 
 Since Thomas Malthus first wrote on population demography in his influential work An 
Essay on the Principle of Population (1798), many worked to analyze and better comprehend the 
demographic transition that has affected the human population since at least the early part of the 
19th century. At the time, Malthus posited that a series of mostly economic checks and balances 
worked to keep population levels in perpetual equilibrium. He argued that the rate of growth in 
food production would never be able to catch up to a rapidly growing human population. At the 
time he was writing, birth rates and death rates were high across the world, meaning that the 
majority of adults were quite young.  
 In a comprehensive work on the topic of the demographic transition, economist Ronald 
Lee (2003) explores the nature by which economic development and other factors led to a 
decline in mortality as states industrialized, followed in turn by a drop in birth rates. 
Improvements in public health, sanitation, and nutrition led to the former, while access to 
contraception and a shift away from labor-intensive agriculture-based economies led to the latter. 
These two trends together work in confluence with each other to bring about population aging. 
 While most countries in Western Europe and North America began this transition in the 
time of Malthus, today’s low-income countries did not begin this process until much later. In the 
case of Sub-Saharan Africa, it was not until sometime after the Second World War that one can 
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say it truly began. The region further had to contend with various other population pressures, 
including a heavy tropical disease burden, that today’s high-income societies simply did not face. 
 Without significant economic development and industrialization, a country cannot 
proceed through the various stages of the demographic transition. While the development that 
has occurred in the last half-century have instigated a version of this process, the explosive 
impacts of the HIV/AIDS epidemic have counteracted much progress on the African continent. 
Among other negative impacts, the epidemic has kept mortality rates high and life expectancies 
low. During the worst periods of the epidemic, some countries maintained life expectancies in 
the 30s and 40s, meaning that a very large proportion of their adult populations were quite 
young. According to Kalemli-Ozcan (2011), the impact of the AIDS epidemic on African 
fertility rates are yet to be fully understood, but this is nevertheless outside the scope of this 
study since I am principally concerned with young adult, not child, populations. 
 
III. Conflict I: Civil War 
 The causes of civil wars and conflict have been analyzed in great detail in an exhaustive 
literature. There exist two principal frameworks, or approaches, to explaining why civil conflicts 
erupt: the opportunity-oriented perspective and the motive-driven approach. The opportunity, or 
greed-driven, approach is fundamentally rooted in economics and mainly concerns conditions in 
which rebels have the financial resources with which to wage a war against the state (Collier & 
Hoeffler, 2004). This could also include those conditions where the costs of war or of 
recruitment are relatively low. On the other hand, the motive, or grievance-driven, perspective is 
mainly rooted in psychology and relative deprivation theory. According to Gurr (1970), this 
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framework sees the main causes of civil war as arising from a populace’s legitimate economic 
and political concerns, including poverty and authoritarianism.  
 Much work has sought to evaluate civil conflict onset from these two perspectives. For 
the most part, researchers have found the opportunity framework to provide much more robust 
justification for civil conflict onset than the grievance approach. Both Fearon & Laitin (2003) 
and Collier & Hoeffler (2001) make this finding in their work. 
 In their research, Fearon & Laitin attempt to explain why there was such an excess of 
civil conflicts after the end of the Cold War, with the conventional wisdom holding that ethnic 
fractionalization and nationalism were the main causes of this occurrence. In looking at 
independent variables that may explain civil war onset, the authors find no evidence that ethnic 
diversity, heterogeneity, political systems, or the presence of grievances have any predictive or 
explanatory power with regards to civil war onset. Instead, they focus on the concept of 
insurgency. In exploring civil conflict onset through the lens of guerrilla warfare and insurgency, 
F&L are able to deduce that income and poverty have significant predictive power with regards 
to civil conflict, with low-income areas being much more likely to give rise to insurgencies than 
medium- or high-income areas. Numerous other variables are also analyzed, but none seem to 
have an effect on conflict onset, including inequality. 
 Likewise, Collier & Hoeffler look at civil war onset as the dependent variable and 
attempt to discover independent variables with strong predictive power. C&H differ in their 
methods by looking at the likelihood of conflict outbreak over every five-year period from 1960 
to 1999. Over the course of their econometric analysis, they did not find ethnic fractionalization 
or heterogeneity to be strong indicators of conflict onset. Much like F&L, however, they did find 
that strong explanatory power rest with the per capita income and secondary schooling variables. 
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On the other hand, primary commodity exports factor highly in the “greed” analysis of C&H due 
to the increased opportunity for monetary gain. F&L found no such strong relationship. Overall, 
C&H find great explanatory power in opportunity and greed. Primary commodity exports and 
military advantage provide opportunity, whereas male secondary school enrollment and higher 
incomes eschew it. They also look at grievance, but, like F&L, they do not find much 
explanatory power in the variables normally associated with that, such as inequality.  
 On the other hand, Cederman et al. (2011) find a role for grievances in civil conflict 
onset. A number of scholars have looked at individual inequality as an independent variable to 
explain civil war onset, but Cederman et al. use horizontal inequities, both economic and 
political, among groups to predict civil conflict. A new, unique spatial method is employed to 
determine that inequalities in per capita income are significant in explaining the likelihood of 
civil war. Both poor and rich groups appear to be more likely to fight than groups that are closer 
to the average per capita income for a given country. Inequities in ethnic group access to 
executive power is utilized as a political variable, and it appears to be significant as well. As a 
result, Cederman et al. conclude that grievances do play a role in civil conflict onset. 
 
IV. Conflict II: Protest 
 Much work has focused too on protests and other forms of contentious politics, both 
peaceful and violent, and both planned and spontaneous. In many regards, this literature mirrors 
the civil war theory in its continual debate between proponents of grievance-based explanations 
and those of opportunity-based ones. Hendrix et. al (2009) summarize this debate in their work, 
explaining that the grievance framework operates through the mechanism of relative depravation 
theory to alienate those who feel that they are being left behind relative to their expectations. 
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Often scholars examine this through the mechanism of food shocks or steep fluctuations in the 
prices of essential commodities. Nevertheless, much like in the civil war literature, great amounts 
of ink have been spilt refuting the viability of such a grievance framework. 
 On the other hand, the opportunity approach seems to be better suited at explaining 
protest. Branch (2015) has made the argument in his book Africa Uprising that high rates of 
urbanization have greatly improved the opportunities of a populace to organize and protest. He 
acknowledges that rising food prices and other grievances may be constitute motives for protest 
activity, but he also argues that opportunities for protest are what truly matter, with the demands 
taking on a distinctly political flavor, urging for the end of political repression. Hendrix et al. 
(2009) likewise argue that regime type matters a great deal: hybrid regimes pose the greatest 
opportunity for protesters, whilst autocracies can easily cut off all channels and dissent and 
democracies can be more easily influence through traditional mechanisms, such as elections. 
 
V. Youth bulges and civil conflict 
 The role of youth bulges in civil war and protest onset is best understood through the 
grievance framework. The understanding is that youth become aggrieved by lack of economic or 
educational opportunities at the personal level or by political concerns at the macro level; 
regardless, it is the fact that they have qualms that pushes them to resistance (Choucri, 1974; 
Braungart, 1986). Most work on the topic of civil war, from F&L to C&H to Blattman & Miguel 
(2010), are not persuaded by the grievance framework, and thus also do not find that the 
presence of large youth cohorts has explanatory power for civil conflict. Cristopher Cramer 
likewise writes that there does not exist a direct link between young male unemployment and 
political violence, that the association lies more in the loss of belonging and identity than in 
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unemployment itself per se (2010). Resnick and Casale (2011) argue that youth bulges are not 
associated with increased levels of protest activity in Sub-Saharan Africa, and that youth indeed 
display lower levels of civic participation and involvement than their older counterparts. 
 However, the grievance-based approach is not universally dismissed, as attested to by 
Cederman et al. Likewise, Urdal (2006) finds that the lines between the two approaches are 
needlessly strict and that youth bulges do in fact explain conflict. Some factors, he writes, are 
after all classifiable under both frameworks, and no opportunistic incentive for war would exist 
without some grievances. He determines that large cohorts of young people ages 15 to 24 can 
predict great increases in the likelihood of organized political violence. Urdal disagrees explicitly 
with both F&L and C&H, arguing that the reason why their research found no such predictive 
effect was because they calculated youth as a percentage of the entire population and not just as 
a percentage of the adult population. He also cites Collier’s concession that large youth bulges 
can act through the opportunity approach to increase violence by allowing a pool of child 
soldiers to be cheaply recruited (Collier, 2000: 94).  
He also uncovers several variables that can either exacerbate or diminish the likelihood of 
civil conflict in cases where youth bulges are already present. For instance, access to secondary 
and higher education seems to pacify violent youth, whilst having a governmental system 
roughly halfway between democracy and authoritarian dictatorship will only make matters worse 
(Hegre et al, 2001). Blattman and Annan (2010) confirm in their study in the Ivory Coast that 
providing agricultural training to former child soldiers greatly reduces their likelihood to sign up 
as mercenaries. Providing inexpensive access to quality education seems to pacify youth, as long 
as employment opportunities exist. Education both provides opportunities that diminish 
grievances, and if it is less costly than joining the militia, can eliminate the opportunistic 
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incentives of rebelling and raises the costs of recruitment substantially (Choucri, 1974: 73; Brett 
& Specht, 2004; Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). 
 In a different paper, Urdal (2004) argues that the grievance-based approach can be a way 
of linking youth bulges and protests. He finds that slow economic growth and few employment 
opportunities do seem to be predictors of protest activity among youth. Importantly, he notes that 
while improving educational opportunities may be helpful, this is only the case if employment 
opportunities are equally generous, a similar result to the finding in the aforementioned study. If 
not, the likelihood of protest increases. Many scholars have found that African youth spend many 
years in a period of transition between childhood and adulthood known as “waithood,” a time in 
which they are likely to develop significant economic grievances, which may in turn lead to 
protests (Honwana, 2014). With regards to the opportunity literature, Urdal’s work falls into 
agreement with Hendrix et al. (2009) in that quasi-authoritarian regimes appear to provide the 
best opportunity for protest. 
One might question why youth protests are often viewed negatively. If youth are involved 
in protest, does that not demonstrate a commitment to civic engagement? According to Hart et. al 
(2004), the age structure of a society matters deeply in answering this question. If a country is 
“saturated” with children—if the large young adult population coexists primarily alongside a 
very large population of children, and not alongside a sizeable population of older adults, youth 
are not likely to demonstrate significant civic values in their political engagement. What the 
implications of this finding is for protests is not entirely clear, but it demonstrates that the 
negative view of these events, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, may be justifiable. 
 On the other side of the coin, declining fertility rates and increasing life expectancy 
throughout the world may in the future bring the planet to what Urdal calls “a geriatric peace.” 
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The exemplar of this notion is Japan, a country of great life expectancy and tiny fertility rates. It 
and other countries like it are viewed as paragons of peacefulness, and Japan’s median age of 47 























 Data and Methodology 
The methods utilized in the completion of this study are rooted primarily in data 
collection and statistical analysis. I began by collecting data from reputable sources, making 
certain to verify the relevance of the data to my project and seeking out appropriate control 
variables. Upon completion of this process, I undertook a fixed effects panel data regression 
analysis using a statistical software package. 
I commenced by compiling data on the independent variable, the percentage of young 
males aged 15 to 24 in a given African country’s adult male population, with adult being defined 
as those aged 15 or older. I employ this definition because of the strong arguments made by 
Urdal throughout his various publications in favor of drawing this delineation. He argues that 
numerous researchers have failed to find a significant effect tied to a youth bulge measure 
because of their use of a metric of total population as the denominator. In Sub-Saharan Africa 
especially, populations are very young, with countries such as Niger and Uganda counting 50% 
or more of their populations under the age of 15. The inclusion of this huge number of children 
under 15 would serve to “deflate” the youth bulge indicator and render the mechanism more 
difficult to study. As such, accounting only for the adult population is considerably more 
valuable. 
 The data on youth populations comes from perhaps the leading source on the topic of 
world population, the United Nations Population Division. The numbers are widely accepted as 
reputable, and the data is subdivided by age group in multiple different ways, making a 
calculation of the aforementioned youth bulge measure fairly straightforward. One drawback did 
present itself, however: the data is only available in five-year increments from 1990 to 2015. 
Albeit I recognized this as an excellent timeframe to study, I also needed data on the intervening 
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years to associate with the dependent variables in my study. Due to the fact that few other 
sources exist with data that is both as reputable and as complete as that of UNPD’s, I opted to 
interpolate the “missing” population data by fitting the quinquennial data to a linear line. Whilst 
numerous drawbacks do abound with this strategy, most notably the very high likelihood that 
many of these numbers do not evolve in a manner resembling anything close to a straight line, I 
believe that the small timeframe involved is sufficient to warrant such an approach. Summary 
statistics (Table 1) and a graph (Fig. 1) of the data follow: 
Variable Youth bulge (%) 

































 The evolution of the average Sub-Saharan African youth bulge size is mountainous in 
shape, as seen in Figure 1 above. This bizarre formation, rising in size throughout the 1990s 
before plateauing and falling back down throughout the 2000s, warrants investigation. The 
available literature attributes much of this odd, and yet very small, transition to the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic and the rising death rates that caused the proportion of young people within the greater 
adult population to swell. I investigated this correlation by running an ordinary least squares 
regression (OLS) of my youth bulge metric on a measure of the proportion of people living HIV 
in the countries of study to determine if a correlation was present. This dataset was sourced from 
UN AIDS and covers the relevant parameters of the study at hand. 
 Table 2 indicates that an increase of one percentage point in the HIV-infected population 
is associated with a 6.1% increase in the youth bulge. The finding is statistically significant at 
both the 5 and 1% levels. 
 
Table 2: Youth Bulge and HIV/AIDS 
 Percent Youth 





N             962 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
 
Next, I set to collecting data on my principal dependent variable, a measure of protest 
activity in Sub-Saharan African nations. In deciding the appropriate scope of this variable, I 
made the determination that focusing on civil war and armed conflict would not be apt in this 
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situation for four main reasons: 1.) fewer studies have explored the relationship between youth 
bulges and protests than with civil war, 2.) civil war events are often too few in number to 
provide for encouraging statistical analysis, 3.) the causes of such large-scale events are often 
deeply geopolitical in nature and may not be as directly tied to the status of a country’s 
population as some smaller events might be, and 4.) the empirical findings of the literature are 
similar for both civil war and protest regardless. Conversely, I also decided that street crime, 
petty theft, and other small levels of criminality were unlikely to provide serious population-
related implications even if a statistically significant association were found. As such, I chose 
protest events as a suitable middle ground and consequently the main dependent variable. 
In finding the necessary African protest data, I looked to two well-known, reputable 
databases of social conflict studies. SCAD, the Social Conflict Analysis Database, and ACLED, 
the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, proved to be the most salient sources of 
African conflict data. Fortunately, both provide data on the years from 1990 to 2015, the years 
set as the parameters for my study. I elected to use SCAD because of its stronger micro-level 
data component and its method of sub-classifying myriad protest-type events. Of these types of 
events, I selected four that I found most relevant to my overall research question. Numbered in 
the dataset from 1 to 4, these include: organized demonstrations, spontaneous demonstrations, 
organized violent riot, spontaneous violent riot. I did not include other event types, such as 
general strikes, that would likely be more associated with a country’s economic situation than 
with its demography.  
The SCAD dataset is rich in the information it provides about its data points. It furnishes 
the researcher with an exact location, time span, start and end dates, number killed, and often a 
brief description of the events involved. I compiled a data file, pairing the youth bulge data with 
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the conflict data, taking care to maintain distinctions between the four event types while also 
accounting for the total number of events. In addition, I included a dichotomous variable for each 
event type and for the total events variable, asking only if any events transpired in a given 
country in a certain year. For events spanning multiple years, I coded that data point to the year 
in which that event began. 
Variable Protests (continuous) Protests (dichotomous) 
Number of observations 1,118 1,118 
Mean 4.384 0.713 
Median 2 1 
Minimum 0 0 
Maximum 67 1 
Variance 59.093 0.205 


























In a research study of this sort, confounding variables need to be taken into careful 
consideration if a meaningful result is to be produced. Finding a link between population 
dynamics and conflict may be noteworthy, but without accounting for various other variables it 
is difficult to evaluate the relationship between the dependent and the independent variables, and 
the regression may be spurious. In finding adequate control variables, I considered carefully 
what factors may be correlated with both the dependent and independent variables. 
Including a measure of economic well-being is important because propensity to protest is 
highly correlated with one’s economic and social situation, and because birth rates are likewise 
impacted by wealth. I determined that GDP per capita would provide an appropriate measure of 
socioeconomic status, and I sourced the relevant data from the World Bank. The World 
Development Indicators it provides were utilized to generate GDP per capita numbers for every 
country in Sub-Saharan Africa from 1990 to 2015. 
I also wanted to include a measure of political freedom, since ability to protest and the 
likelihood that citizens will engage in it is partly reflected by the nature of the active political 
regime in a given country. As such, I looked to Freedom House, one of the leading non-
governmental organizations that champions political liberties, for a relevant dataset. The 
institution furnishes two sets of scores: one that measures political rights and one that measures 
civil liberties. Both sets are scalar and measured from 1 to 7, with a score of 1 representing a 
country that is “most free” and a 7 representing one that is “least free.” In creating a single 
variable, I added these two scores for each country in the region for the appropriate 25-year 
period. 
Due to the fact that some events, like elections and civil wars, are highly associated with 
protest activity, I decided to control for these factors as well. I included two dichotomous 
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variables, one accounting for elections and the other for civil wars, in the dataset. Both are coded 
as 1 if an event occurred during a given year and 0 if no events transpired. As part of the election 
variable, I included both national and local elections, as well as referenda. The civil war data 
comes from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program in Sweden, and it defines a civil war as any 
state—group conflict with a minimum of 25 confirmed battle deaths. 
Upon completion of the dataset, I proceeded to conduct regression analysis. Since I am 
studying the protest behavior of people in numerous countries over a given time span, I am 
conducting a panel data analysis. I use a fixed effects model, as shown below, because I am 
looking to remove the unobserved effect prior to estimation, along with any time-constant 
explanatory variables. This is typically the estimator that is employed in policy analysis of this 
sort, as I am seeking to compute effect size for the identified population and due to the fact that 
all the country-level studies are functionally identical and were not independently produced. I am 
essentially seeking to understand not just the relationship between youth bulges and protest, but 
also how that relationship changes over time. 
yit   = a + xit b + vi + eit 
 
 I do not employ a random effects estimator because I do not conclude that the unobserved 
effect is uncorrelated with all my explanatory variables, nor am I faced with a random sample of 
data at different levels. Rather, I operate under the general assumption that there is one “true 
effect” that is the same for all the studies.  
 For my main regression, I employed the dichotomous variant of the total events variable. 
I opted for this because I believe the difference between zero and any events is more 
fundamental to my core research question than perhaps the difference between 3 and 4 events. In 
other words, the difference between 0 and 1 is the difference between peace and conflict while 
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the difference between 3 and 4 only describes different shades of unrest. The former is likely to 
be more important to a study of demographics than the latter. 
 I used the statistical software package Stata to run the fixed effects regression. I regressed 
the total events measure on the continuous variable describing a given country’s youth bulge. I 
controlled for GDP per capita, the country’s Freedom House scores, whether an election was 
held in a given year, and whether a civil war was in the process of transpiring. Whilst my main 
dependent variable here is categorical, I opted against the use of a logistic model like Logit or of 
a normal model such as Probit. This allows for a more straightforward understanding of the 
results, and is a practice that has been gaining ground in recent years in social science research. 
 In order to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the many mechanisms at play, I 
also executed this same regression on Anglophone and Francophone countries separately, on 
different geographic areas of the continent, and on the basis of the majority or plurality religion 
in the country. I also studied organized and spontaneous protest events separately by utilizing the 
accompanying dichotomous variables; I hypothesized that spontaneous events may be more 
related to the size of the youth population than organized events which could have greater 












 I run different regressions based on country language, geography, country religion, and 
protest event type. The results follow below. 
Table 4: Protest Events, by Country Type (Fixed Effects) 
 All Countries Anglophone Only Francophone Only 
Percent Youth 0.033 0.037 0.009 
 (3.08)** (2.32)* (0.50) 
GDP Per Capita 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (2.42)* (1.00) (3.20)** 
Sum FH Scores -0.008 -0.006 -0.020 
 (1.10) (0.70) (1.47) 
Election 0.090 0.075 0.102 
 (3.31)** (1.95) (2.46)* 
Civil War 0.000 0.080 0.033 
 (0.00) (0.95) (0.62) 
_cons -0.449 -0.619 0.381 
 
 










R2 0.02 0.02 0.04 
N                       1,095                            473                       468 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
 
Table 4 represents one of the main regressions in the study, whereby I regressed a metric 
of events on a measure of the youth bulge in Sub-Saharan African countries by conducting a 
fixed-effects regression. The first column furnishes the relevant results for the principal 
regression, while the second and third columns provide data differentiated based on linguistic 
and colonial history. 
The regression output in the first column, “all countries,” indicates that, holding all else 
constant, an increase of one percentage point in the youth bulge is associated with a 3.3 
percentage point increase in the likelihood of an event. Given the very low p-value (0.002), this 
result is highly statistically significant. 
The included control variables act as a safeguard against over-attributing the occurrence 
of an event to the size of the youth bulge. One of the control variables, a dichotomous measure of 
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whether an election happened in a certain country in a given year, is statistically significant at the 
1% level. All else being equal, the occurrence of an election is associated with an 8.97 
percentage point increase in the likelihood of an event. 
The other three control variables, on the other hand, lack significance at the 1% level. A 
measure of GDP per capita is barely significant at the 5% level, but the other two, a metric of 
political freedom tabulated from Freedom House scores, and a dummy variable that is 0 if a civil 
war was not taking place or 1 if it was, are not. In these cases, the coefficients indicate that 
changes in these variables are associated with negligible change in the likelihood of an event. 
Further substantiating the significance of this model is the fact that the F-statistic, 0.0002, 
is far lower than 0.05. This allows us to reject the null hypothesis that all the coefficients are 
equal to zero. 
R-squared is quite low, indicating that the model explains fairly little of the response data 
around its mean. R-squared here is a weighted average of measures of the variance within, as 
well as between, panel units that is accounted by the model. It only accounts for about 2% of this 
variance. This is not inherently problematic because I am attempting to understand the marginal 
effect of the male youth bulge upon protest activity and not a physical process where high levels 
of precision are important. R-squared is not determinative of whether coefficient estimates are 
biased, and here I have found coefficients with statistically significant predictors. This allows me 
to draw certain conclusions despite the low R-squared values. 
The output also reports rho, the interclass correlation and a function of sigma_u and 
sigma_e. It indicates that 29.77% of the variance is due to differences across panels.  
 Conducting this regression for Anglophone and Francophone countries separately 
revealed some surprising results. Holding all else fixed, an increase of one percentage point in 
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the youth bulge of an Anglophone country is associated with a 3.7 percentage point increase in 
the likelihood of a protest event. The p-value indicates that this coefficient is statistically 
significant at the 5% level. For Francophone countries, however, an increase of one percentage 
point in the youth population is associate with merely a 0.9 percentage point increase in the 
likelihood of a protest event, and it is not significant at the 5% level.  
 While traditional understandings of African colonialism claim that the British and French 
models were differentiated by a focus on indirect and direct rule, respectively. Nevertheless, 
numerous scholars, including Jeffrey Herbst (2000), allege that this dominant understanding is 
overblown, as the French did not appear to make the investments in road infrastructure or 
education that would typically be associated with direct rule. Hence, it is quite likely that 
differing colonial experiences might not be the main story here. I theorized that the odd result 
might be tied to geography, so I executed another regression, this time on a regional basis as 
shown in Table 5. 
Table 5: Protest Events, by Geographic Region (Fixed Effects) 
         West Africa       Central Africa         East Africa      Southern Africa 
Percent 
Youth 
0.080 0.045 0.012 0.029 
 (3.08)** (1.61) (0.77) (1.23) 
GDP Per 
Capita 
0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (2.59)* (2.81)** (0.85) (0.06) 
Sum FH 
Scores 
-0.008 -0.014 0.006 -0.013 
 (0.64) (0.68) (0.37) (0.73) 
Election 0.103 0.072 0.158 0.011 
 (2.31)* (1.25) (2.58)* (0.18) 
Civil War -0.012 0.074 -0.030 -0.096 
 (0.18) (1.06) (0.38) (0.50) 
_cons -2.201 -0.955 0.148 -0.250 
 (2.33)* (0.93) (0.24) (0.28) 
R2 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.01 
N                              390                              239                                258                                 208 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
 
 The results are revealing: much of the variation is explained by the West African sector, 
which consists almost entirely of French-speaking nations. Holding all else constant, an increase 
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of a single percentage point in the youth bulge of a West African country is associated with an 
astounding 8 percentage point increase in the likelihood of an event. This finding is statistically 
significant at even the 1% level, while none of the other regions have significant coefficients at 
even the 5% level. 
 Unfortunately, this result contradicts the previous finding, and I was thus forced to 
reevaluate. Since West and Central Africa contain nearly all the Muslim-majority countries in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, it began to appear much more likely that the presence of Islam and hence, 
the institution of polygamy, have a stronger effect than either French or British colonial heritage. 
I performed the regression again, this time dividing the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa into 
Muslim-majority countries and non-Muslim-majority countries, which in practice contain either 
Christian or animist majorities or pluralities, or in the case of Mauritius, a slim Hindu majority. 
The relevant results are summarized in Table 6. 
Table 6: Protest Events, by Religious Majority (Fixed Effects) 
              All         Muslim            Other 
Percent Youth 0.033 0.040 0.025 
 (3.08)** (2.15)* (1.95) 
GDP Per Capita 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (2.42)* (2.79)** (1.43) 
Sum FH Scores -0.008 -0.021 0.002 
 (1.10) (1.77) (0.25) 
Election 0.090 0.039 0.113 
 (3.31)** (0.80) (3.44)** 
Civil War 0.000 -0.006 -0.008 
 (0.00) (0.11) (0.14) 
_cons -0.449 -0.626 -0.270 
 (1.14) (0.91) (0.56) 
R2 0.02 0.05 0.02 
N                                                                       1,095                           336                           759    
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
 
 Holding all else constant, an increase of a single percentage point in the youth bulge of a 
Muslim-majority country is associated with a 4 percentage point increase in the likelihood of an 
event. This finding is statistically significant at even the 5% level, while significance is not found 
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in the countries with a non-Muslim majority.  
 I also interacted the youth bulge measure with a dichotomous Muslim variable, 1 if the 
country is mainly Muslim and 0 if it is not, to be able to look at the differing marginal effects of 
the youth bulge depending on religious status. The finding depicted in Figure 3 confirms that this 
marginal effect is larger for Islamic nations than for non-Islamic nations. The practical meaning 
of this finding is that certain elements of Islamic life, including polygamy, exacerbate the effect 
of the youth bulge on protest, as young men have fewer opportunities at family formation. 
 
Fig. 3 
I also conducted a panel data regression analysis by subdividing the four relevant event 
types as follows: type 1 – organized demonstration, type 2 – spontaneous demonstration, type 3 – 
organized violent riot, and type 4 – spontaneous violent riot. I hypothesized that my findings 
would be more significant with regards to the spontaneous events because organized events have 
stronger geopolitical ties whilst spontaneous events are more rooted in the everyday. The 
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Table 7: Protest Events, by Type (Fixed Effects) 
 Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4 
Percent Youth 0.021 0.016 0.025 0.025 
 (1.77) (1.35) (3.17)** (2.13)* 
GDP Per Capita 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (1.90) (2.54)* (0.28) (1.24) 
Sum FH Scores 0.000 0.004 -0.001 -0.005 
 (0.05) (0.54) (0.12) (0.63) 
Election 0.027 0.085 0.070 0.070 
 (0.89) (2.81)** (3.46)** (2.30)* 
Civil War 0.083 0.005 -0.002 0.059 
 (1.88) (0.11) (0.06) (1.35) 
_cons -0.477 -0.225 -0.788 -0.487 
 (1.08) (0.51) (2.70)** (1.11) 
R2 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 
N                   1,095                1,095                1,095                  1,095 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
 
 Rather than confirming my particular suspicions, this output shows that the main divide 
in significance is not one between planned and unplanned events, but between demonstrations 
and violent riots. Neither of the coefficients on the demonstration metrics are significant, 
whereas both of the violent riot coefficients are. For both types 3 and 4, a one-percentage point 
increase in the youth population is associated with a 2.5 percentage point increase in the 
likelihood of a violent riot. 
 To better understand these findings, it is helpful to explore them at the country level. 













Case Study: Nigeria 
I. Background 
 Nigeria is a large country situated on the Atlantic coast in the western part of the African 
continent. The most populous country in Africa, Nigeria accounts for one-sixth of all Africans 
with a rapidly growing population of 190 million people. It is expected that by 2050, Nigeria will 
have overtaken the United States to be the world’s 3rd most populous nation and will boast an 
astounding population of 440 million. 
 
Fig. 4 
 The change in the country’s youth bulge is similar to that seen in neighboring countries in 
the region, depicting the “hump” shape that is seen below in Figure 5. The country’s experience 
with protests is also fairly similar to that of other Sub-Saharan African states, although it has had 
a relatively greater number of them. Overall, the youth bulge measure is somewhat more 





 The rapid growth of the population is the result of a very high fertility rate—about 5.5 
children per woman—and of population momentum, as can be noted in the population pyramid 
in Figure 4. The median age of the population is only 18 and those over 65 account for a far 
smaller proportion of the population than in any developed nation. However, the Nigerian 
demographic story is not playing out evenly across the entirety of the country, making an 
excellent case for further study. There exists in Nigeria a rather stark north-south divide, as 
depicted in the map in Figure 6. The Northern states are characterized by their majority Islamic 




























 As indicated on the map, the legal systems also differ between the two halves of the 
country, with the South utilizing the British common law system and the North employing sharia 
law. The practical effect of this difference for this study is that polygamy is legal and practiced in 
the North, whereas the same does not hold true for Southern Nigeria. In fact, according to The 
Economist magazine, 40% of married Northern women share a husband (2016). This astounding 
fact means that the North has far more unmarried and “unmoored” young men than the South 
does, providing us with an excellent point of intra-country comparison for the purposes of this 
study. The North is indeed the home and stomping grounds of the infamous terror group Boko 
Haram, and the region also suffers from greater poverty, lower GDP per capita, and lower 
foreign investment than the oil-rich South. According to the Pew Research Center, Christian 
Nigerians have on average 7.1 years of formal schooling, whilst their Muslim counterparts only 
enjoy about 3 years of education. 
 I collected state-level population data for each state, paired it with the relevant data from 
the SCAD dataset, and aggregated the set into two categories: Northern and Southern states. I ran 
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a regression in much the same way as I did in the main body of the study, controlling for GDP 
per capita. 
II. Findings  
 I conducted a fixed effects regression using the Nigerian protest data. The relevant 
findings from the econometric analysis are summarized in Table 8.  
Table 8: Protest Events, by Region of Nigeria (Fixed Effects) 
      North      Nigeria          South 
Percent Youth 0.039 0.035 0.018 
 (4.42)** (5.39)* (1.93) 
GDP per Capita 0.004 0.002 0.002 
 (1.17) (0.68) (1.23) 
Sum of FH Scores -0.041 -0.027 -0.029 
 (1.19) (1.38)* (1.98) 
Election 0.137 0.042 1.015 
 (0.69)* (0.87) (0.33) 
Civil War 0.008 0.009 0.087 
 (0.11) (0.43) (0.04) 
_cons -0.092 -0.078 -0.094 
 (0.96) (0.87) (0.69) 
R2 0.08 0.07 0.05 
N                  494                   936                      442 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
 
The results are as expected. Holding all else constant, a one-percentage point increase in a youth 
bulge is associated with a 3.9 percentage point increase in the number of protest events in 
Northern Nigeria. This finding is statistically significant at the 1% level, as is the finding for the 
whole of Nigeria. 
 On the other hand, the result for Southern Nigeria is not statistically significant. Given 
the differences between the two regions in terms of religion, polygamy, legal system, and 
economic status, this makes sense. The young men in Southern Nigeria have more opportunities 
to become employed and to become educated than their counterparts in the North, and they also 
have far more opportunities at marriage and family formation.  
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 This finding is consistent with, and confirmed by, a marginal effects estimator. By 
interacting the youth bulge term with a dichotomous variable for Muslim status, I am able to 
determine that the male youth bulge, while already being larger in the North than in the South, 





III. Who is protesting, and why? 
 The identities, aims, and targets of Nigerian protesters and rioters are diverse. According 
to the dataset, those taking part in protests have come from every sector of society, including 
students, health workers, village women, labor unions, rebels, and many others. Nevertheless, it 
appears that young men do form a large portion, perhaps the majority, of those engaged in 
protests and demonstrations. Their targets have been varied: the government has been a focus of 
these events, but so have religious groups and large multinational oil and gas corporations. Some 
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target of protests, while in the mid-2010s, the terrorist organization Boko Haram emerged as the 
main actor taking part in these events. 
 A large number of protests in Nigeria take the form of election-related violence. A report 
issued by Human Rights Watch after the 2011 presidential election confirms the deadly nature of 
this form of violence, as more than eight hundred people were left dead in the wake of this 
election. Due to the highly splintered nature of Nigerian politics, the North-South divide 
represents a highly salient electoral boundary. When Muhammadu Buhari, a Muslim Northerner, 
was defeated by Goodluck Jonathan, a Christian Southerner, interethnic conflict broke out 
throughout the country. This was exacerbated by allegations of voter fraud. Rioters were often 
encouraged by corrupt politicians, and the great majority of them were young men.  
IV. Changes over time 
 As discussed previously, the evolution of Nigeria’s youth bulge over the period from 
1990 to 2015 mirrors that of other countries in the region. The persistence of a high birth rate and 
a low life expectancy keeps the population young. The youth bulge in the North is somewhat 
larger due to the presence of an even higher birth rate and an even lower life expectancy. 
However, the change of the youth bulge over time is similar to what is seen in the South: an 
increase in the percentage of the youth population in the mid-90s as a result of rising HIV/AIDS 
mortality rates is followed by a decrease as mortality rates decline. Birth rates overall also 
decline over this period. 
 Over the relevant timespan, the educational and employment opportunities of both 
Northerners and Southerners appear to increase, with a large gap maintained between the two 
regions. The practice of polygamy does not appear to change as greatly over time, according to 
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the Demographic and Health Survey, but it does seem to be on the decline. The North maintains 

























Case Study: Tanzania 
I. Background 
 Tanzania is a medium-sized country located on the Swahili Coast in the eastern portion of 
the African continent. It currently boasts a population of nearly 57 million people—a number 
that is expected to more than double by mid-century. Like much of Sub-Saharan Africa, 
Tanzania is a very young country, with a median age hovering around 17.4. While slightly lower 
than the median for the region, this figure places the Tanzanian population squarely within the 
norm of the African demographic experience. As such, the typical African population pyramid is 
observed in Figure 8: a broad base at the bottom that reaches a sharp point at the top. Much like 
in Nigeria, a very high birth rate of 5.3 births per woman keeps the country very young, and a 
low life expectancy minimizes the country’s elderly population. 
 
Fig. 8 
The evolution of the country’s youth bulge also mirrors that of the region as a whole, 
with an ever-increasing youth bulge prior to the turn of the millennium counteracted by a 
reversal in the trend after the year 2000. As discussed previously, this situation is likely deeply 
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rooted in the evolution of the HIV/AIDS epidemic on the continent. This change in the youth 
population is depicted in the graph in Figure 9. 
 
Fig. 9 
 In terms of protests, Tanzania has faced a moderate number of such events that again 
position the country squarely within the African norm and make it a worthwhile subject for 
further scholarship. The lack of a civil war or any large-scale conflict over the timespan under 
study is also helpful because it allows us to carefully look at the dependent variable without 
conflating it with other forms of civil conflict. 
 Another reason why Tanzania provides for an interesting case study surrounds the 
religious demographics of the population. Tanzanians on the whole tend to practice three main 
religions, and they do so in roughly equal numbers. These are Islam, Christianity, and African 
indigenous faiths. Islam arrived in present-day Tanzania in the centuries after the founding of the 
faith through transoceanic interactions between the Arabs and Persians of West Asia and the 
Swahili people of East Africa. The faith did not, however, penetrate toward the interior of the 


























Ocean coast as well as on the island of Zanzibar, where they account for approximately 99% of 




 Tanzania is part of the so-called “polygamy belt” that spreads across Africa from Senegal 
to the East, a region of the continent where polygamy is legal and widely practiced. According to 
Howland and Koenen (2014), approximately 25% of the marriages in the United Republic of 
Tanzania are polygamous and they are heavily concentrated in the Muslim-dominated regions of 
the country. In Zanzibar, a separate Islamic legal system works to enshrine polygynous unions 
into the local culture. The authors make the additional argument that in more modern areas of the 
country, especially in the city of Dar es Salaam, de facto polygamy tends to prevail as a result of 
changing cultural norms. While the marriage is technically not legally solemnized, the practical 
effect is the same: many men will find their own marriage prospects vastly reduced because 
some of their peers have taken multiple wives. Much like I argued in the previous section, the 
practice of polygamy is a potent and dangerous ingredient that, when mixed with the presence of 




 Much like in the previous section, I collected sub-national population data for each of the 
thirty administrative divisions in the country, paired it with the relevant data from the SCAD 
dataset, and aggregated the set into two categories: Muslim and non-Muslim majority areas. I ran 
a regression, controlling for GDP per capita. I then conducted a time series regression using the 
total events dummy variable. The relevant findings from the econometric analysis are 
summarized in Table 9.  





Percent Youth                   0.041 0.026 0.060 
 (2.09)* (1.51)* (3.19)** 
GDP Per Capita -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (1.59) (4.44)** (0.75) 
Sum FH Scores -0.054 -0.061 -0.053 
 (0.38)* (0.43) (0.24)* 
Election 0.096 0.070 0.114 
 (0.52)* (0.95) (0.87) 
_cons -0.069 -0.035 -0.108 
 (0.80) (0.93) (1.46) 
R2 0.12 0.14 0.15 
N        780        520          260 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
 
The results are not surprising. All else being equal, a one-percentage point increase in a 
youth bulge is associated with a 6 percentage point increase in the likelihood of a protest event in 
the coastal areas and Zanzibar. This finding is statistically significant at the 1% level. The 
findings for the country as a whole and for the Christian and animist portions of the country are 
also significant, but only at the 5% level and at a lower magnitude. 
I again looked at marginal effects, discovering that the youth bulge is quite a lot more 





In conjunction with the previous case study, this finding is to be expected. While the 
demographic nature of the youth bulge does not vary too much across the country, there are clear 
differences in the way that it impacts upon protest activity in Tanzania, as it affects Muslim-
majority areas quite a bit more heavily. The men of these regions have fewer opportunities to 
form families, and thus fewer opportunities to be “moored,” as The Economist put it.  
III. Who is protesting, and why? 
 Tanzania has on the whole been privy to a smaller number of protests than Nigeria. 
Nevertheless, the identities of the protesters and their aims are just as varied. Young people, 
including students, again appear to play a strong role. Many of the events can be attributed to 
religious tensions or to inter-party political strife, much of it also being religiously-motivated. 
 What is perhaps most salient to this discussion is the political malaise surrounding the 
islands of Zanzibar, which Polish historian and reporter Ryszard Kapuściński called “a sad, dark 
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politics can only be described as deeply troubled. According to international media reports at the 
time, the 2015 elections there were marred by questions of vote-rigging and intimidation. Deadly 
protests that followed were dominated by young men. The question of Zanzibar’s status, with its 
separate governance structures and heavily Muslim population, weighs profoundly upon the 
shoulders of its leaders and people.  
IV. Changes over time 
 The evolution of Tanzania’s youth bulge is very similar to what is observed in other 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, including Nigeria. The Muslim-majority areas of the country do 
exhibit the same hump-shaped pattern that is seen elsewhere, although the youth bulge is larger 
in that part of the country than it is elsewhere. 
 Educational and employment opportunities appear to be more limited in the Muslim-
dominated regions than in other parts of the country, however they are likely increasing 
throughout. The practice of polygamy does appear to be on the decline, but this trend is slow and 













 In this study, I have found that larger youth bulges are associated with an increased 
likelihood of protest in Sub-Saharan Africa. That fact alone is perhaps less interesting or 
important than the reasons for or implications of this reality.  
 As part of the main regression for this project, I conducted numerous subgroup analyses 
to determine a plausible explanation for the principle finding. I began by looking at colonial 
history, given the dominant view that the British preferred an indirect system of governance 
while the French opted for direct rule. This hunch did not bear out, and indeed many scholars 
have called into question whether or not European colonial rule varied greatly across the 
different powers. Jeffrey Herbst (2000) even argues that French rule was in all likelihood less 
direct than the British system, given a lower investment in infrastructure on their part. In 1963, 
British territories had, proportionally, more twice as many kilometers of road as the French 
territories. 
 In reevaluating my analysis, I was able to find that the Muslim-Christian divide is the 
most salient to the main question. In Muslim-majority countries, the size of the youth bulge was 
more predictive of protest activity than in countries without a majority of the population adhering 
to the Islamic faith. But why? Here, it is important to evaluate young men’s opportunities in 
these religious contexts: can they become educated, seek and find employment, and start a 
family? 
 Here, I should enter a word of caution. The size of this effect is, on the whole, quite 
small. I do not present a case that African Muslims are somehow innately dangerous, but rather 
that certain institutions present within that community give way to a heightened likelihood of 
protest. A greater likelihood which is, like most findings in social science, rather small in scope. 
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 It is also important to note, however, that I do not advance the notion that youth bulges 
matter only insofar as more young people, or even more young men, are present in a given 
country. Rather, the problem must be further conceptualized in two additional ways. Firstly, it is 
quite likely that the presence of a large population of young men may have a positive impact on 
other citizens’ propensity to protest. As previously noted, Hart et al. (2004) found that young 
adults are significantly less likely to demonstrate “civic values” when coexisting in a society 
made up of more children than adults older than themselves. Clearly, a “peer effect” is at work 
here: perhaps, a larger proportion of young men demonstrating may shift the norms and make it 
more acceptable for others to protest as well. The notion of a peer effect is a deeply salient one, 
and recent research from Holden et al. (2017) even makes the claim that individual U.S. Supreme 
Court justices will rule in a more conservative or liberal manner given the presence of more 
right- or left-leaning justices on the Court. Variations of this notion have been found in other 
areas, and perhaps it holds relevance for societal protests as well. 
 It is also of great importance to evaluate the components that make a youth bulge 
predictive of protests. After all, some countries with larger youth bulges may have fewer protests 
on the whole. According to the literature, an opportunity-based approach is best suited to 
examining this issue. When individuals, particularly young men, have low opportunity costs, 
they are much likelier to feel that they have less to lose. That is, without an education, job, and 
family, they may feel that demonstrating may be a worthwhile avenue to pursue. Especially 
when combined with considerations of male alienation, a potent brew has occasion to congeal. 
 So how then do the Muslim-dominated portions of Sub-Saharan Africa stack up against 
their Christian and animist counterparts in terms of educational and employment opportunities? 
In terms of education, the answer is simple: not well. According to the Pew Research Center, 
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65% of Muslims in Sub-Saharan Africa have no formal schooling while the same is true for only 
30% of Christians. Numerous scholars have tried to explain this wide chasm. Dahir (2017) 
makes the argument that a lack of missionary or state schools in Muslim areas is the main reason 
for this phenomenon. Colonial governments felt that there was already a system of Islamic 
education in place and that were would consequently be low demand for a Western-style 
education. Izama (2013) makes a more localized argument that focuses on Islam’s relative lack 
of hierarchy and differences in the way it has been practiced across space and time.  
 Whatever the reason, the gap in education is real and large. Employment, on the other 
hand, is a more difficult measure to evaluate. Many, if not most, of Africa’s workers labor in the 
informal sector; consequently, it is difficult to ascertain a reasonably accurate estimate for this 
variable. Nevertheless, it is clear that foreign investment is focused heavily on Christian areas. 
This includes countries like South Africa and Kenya as opposed to Niger and Mali, but it also 
consists of Southern as opposed to Northern Nigeria. Conflicts in these areas, from Boko 
Haram’s attacks in Northern Nigeria to continuing unrest in the Sahel, threaten private property 
and discourage investment, thereby perpetuating a vicious cycle of low opportunity and violence 
that feeds off of itself in what Collier (2007) calls a “conflict trap.” 
 Perhaps an even more important consideration is the practice of polygamy throughout the 
Muslim parts of Sub-Saharan Africa. Much like the preference for sons and sex-selective 
abortions of East Asia, the practice of polygyny places young men, especially the most 
disadvantaged among them, into a very difficult marriage market. This provides these men with 
precisely the low opportunity costs that tend to be predictive of conflict. Indeed, Fenske (2013) 
finds that the practice of polygamy is deeply intertwined with low educational investment and 
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also has historical roots that tie to past exposure to the slave trade. This creates a positive 
feedback loop of low opportunity of the type noted previously. 
 Data from the Demographic and Health Survey confirms that polygamy is a widespread 
practice throughout the Muslim-dominated parts of the African continent. As can be seen in the 
map depicted in Figure 12 below, the nations of West Africa and the Sahel have the highest rates 
of polygamy in Sub-Saharan Africa, here measured as the proportion of married women who 
have at least one co-wife.  
 
Fig. 12 
 I collected data from the DHS on the changing polygamy rate in Sub-Saharan African 
countries. I looked at marginal effects in much the same way that I did previously in this study. 
Figure 13 depicts the finding: at polygamy level “1”, fewer than 10% of married women have 
two or more co-wives. At “2”, between 10% and 20% do. Finally, at “3”, more than 20% of 
married women have two or more co-wives; this represents a rather small group of data points. 
The finding here is quite clear: the youth bulge is more predictive of protest activity in places 
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where the practice of polygamy is more widespread. As mentioned previously, this is to be 
expected given the tightened marriage markets that polygyny creates for young men. 
 
Fig. 13 
 As discussed previously, the type of protest activity discussed here is not the type that we 
would normally associate with high-minded civic engagement. Much of it is violent and deadly. 
Indeed, I found a much stronger effect for violent riots than I did for demonstrations. Therefore, 
it would be prudent to consider possible policy implications that would help alleviate this reality. 
Improved provision of family planning services through increased funding of the UN Population 
Fund and other agencies would aid in reducing the youth bulge, although I would argue that 
governments should focus less on this half of the equation and more on increasing the 
opportunity cost of protest. They should especially not emphasize draconian methods of culling 
the youth population. 
 First, governments should spend more on education, especially in the Muslim-dominated 
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in a vacuum: Urdal (2004) emphasizes that education without employment prospects is more 
strongly associated with protests than no education at all. Hence, it is important to create a 
business-friendly atmosphere where foreign investment and trade are encouraged and private 
property rights are respected. Secondly, the practice of polygamy should be curtailed, as best as 
possible, through cultural and public education initiatives. Eventually, a legal ban should be 
established. 
 This paper makes a few contributions of note: it examines the youth bulge—conflict 
question in the context of Sub-Saharan Africa and looks at demonstrations and riots as opposed 
to civil war. In this context, it finds a predictive effect of large youth populations on protest. I 
also use this project to advance the notion that this effect can vary widely across time and space 
as the opportunity costs of protesting wax and wane. Nevertheless, there are numerous areas 
where future contributions can be made. 
 One such possible area of future study concerns the acquisition of a deeper understanding 
of the ways in which political psychology affects protest. My study and those of others have 
been mainly group-focused, and it would be instructive to better comprehend individual 
motivations through a psychological perspective. A second area of future study concerns the role 
of technology. Across the Western world today, antisocial behavior is rapidly declining, and it is 
likely that the ubiquitous presence of smartphones, social media, and the Internet has had a major 
role to play in this shift. Future research should examine whether technology is playing a similar 
role in the African protest context. A third area of study would be to compare civil wars and 
violent riots, as the effect I found was significant for violent riots but not demonstrations, and 
violent riots share perhaps share more in common with civil wars. Finally, the peer effect of 




In this paper, I find a small, but significant effect of the youth bulge on protest activity in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. The study posits that certain societal conditions found in greatest degree in 
Muslim-majority countries, such as few educational and employment opportunities and the 
prevalence of polygamous marriages, tends to strengthen the relationship by offering young men 
few alternatives to conflict. I look at two countries, Nigeria and Tanzania, which have large, but 
geographically distinct, populations of Muslims and non-Muslims. State-level data from these 
countries also support the notion that low opportunity costs increase the likelihood of protest. 
Policymakers should not make ill-fated attempts to change population profiles, but rather to offer 
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